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THE COMMERCE CLAUSE-
COMMONWEALTH COMPARISONS 
GREG TAYLOR* 
Abstract: As is well known, the United States (U.S.) Supreme 
Court appears to be re-defining its approach to the commerce 
clause: limits on federal power again are being enunciated. 
However, the debate on this issue in the United States is taking 
place without any significant consideration of the comparative 
law on the subject from Canada and Australia, which have 
similar clauses in their constitutions. As this Article shows, Ca-
nadian and Australian law confirm that the approach of the 
Supreme Court majority is preferable to that of the minority. 
Furthermore, the minority's fear that drawing boundaries may 
prove impossible is shown, by consideration of the experience 
of Canada and Australia, to be exaggerated. 
INTRODUCTION 
There are many possibilities inherent in comparative constitu-
tional law for the growth of American jurisprudence.! No extensive 
citation of articles and cases is needed to remind American readers 
that, in the wake of U.S. v. Lopez2 and U.S. v. Mornson,3 the interpreta-
tion of the commerce clause4 is currently a matter of great interest in 
the United States. This Article contributes to the American discussion 
by showing how two other comparable federations, Canada and Aus-
tralia, deal with the equivalent provisions in their constitutions and 
concludes that comparative constitutional law comes down decidedly 
* Greg Taylor is a lecturer in law at the University of Adelaide, Ausu·alia. He has hon-
ors degrees in Arts and Law from the University of Adelaide and an LL.M. and a doctoral 
degree from the University of Marl>lu'g, Germany. He is a barrister and solicitor of the 
Supreme Court of South Australia and teaches, among other subjects. Comparative Consti-
tutional Law. 
1 See generally Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative COllstitutiollal Law, 108 YALE 
LJ. 1225 (1999). 
2514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
3 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000). For a comment on the case before it reached the Supreme 
Court, see Recent Case, 113 HARV L. REv. 816 (2000). 
4 U.S. CON ST. art. I, § 8, d. 3. 
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on the side of the majorities in those two cases, that is, in favor of lim-
iting the reach of the commerce power to some extent. 
Space does not permit a comprehensive catalogue of all the cases 
decided in Canada and Australia under the powers in their constitu-
tional documents which equate to the American commerce clause. It 
is, however, possible to point out that neither Canada nor Australia 
has adopted as sweeping an interpretation of the equivalent constitu-
tional provisions as had the United States before Lopez. In neither 
country has it ever been accepted doctrine that judicial review on 
federalism grounds should be attenuated. By restricting the scope of 
the commerce clause in the manner suggested in Lopez and Monison, 
the Supreme Court of the United States is, therefore, merely bringing 
American law closer to the law of comparable federations. 
1. THE CONTROVERSY IN THE UNITED STATES 
Modern American constitutional law on the commerce clause 
began in 1937 with the New Deal and the "switch in time" by the 
Court, and more specifically by Justice Roberts, in that year.5 The 
"switch in time" of 1937 together with case law of the 1940s-most 
notably, the celebrated6 case of Wickard v. Filburn 7_gave the com-
merce clause a potential for expansion that seemed unlimited. This 
expansion was confirmed by the civil-rights cases of the 1960s,8 which 
opened up vast new possibilities of congressional regulation of com-
merce in order to achieve non-commercial aims. 
The seemingly limitless possibilities, however, now have been lim-
ited by the Supreme Court's decisions in Lopez and Monison which, 
over the strong dissents of four Justices, reveal that the reach of the 
5 See, e.g., William Lasser, justice Roberts and the Constitutional Revolution of 1937-Has 
There a "Switch In Time"?, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1347 (2000); Mark Tushnet, The New Deal Constitu-
tional Revolution: Law, Politics, or What?, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 1061 (1999) (reviewing BARRY 
CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT (1998». Significant earlier contributions 
to the debate have been made by Felix Frankfurter, Mr justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 
311, 314 (1955); William E. Leuchtenberg, The Origins of RD. Roosevelt's "Court-Packing" 
Plan, SUP. CT. REv. 347, 381 (1966); SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN, WORKING WITH ROOSEVELT 156 
(1952); Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. 
L. REv. 645, 681 (1946); ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA: ORI-
GIN AND EVOLUTION OF ITS FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS 495-97, 499 (1965); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
GOD SAVE THIS HONOURABLE COURT 67 (1985). 
6 See Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REv. 674, 674 (1995). 
7317 U.S. III (1942). 
8 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 
379 U.S. 294 (1964); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); see also Perez v. United States, 402 
U.S. 146 (1971). 
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commerce clause is not unbounded and, more broadly, that judicial 
review of federal statutes to ensure that they fall within Congress's 
enumerated powers is not dead, as some had thought it might be.9 
These cases, of course, have touched off a great deal of discussion in 
the United States about the meaning and extent of the newly discov-
ered limitations.1o Conspicuous by its absence, however, has been any 
mention of the comparable provisions of the Canadian and Australian 
Constitutions. 
II. CANADAll 
A. Distribution of Powers 
Section 91 (2) of Canada's Constitution Act of 1867 appears to 
give the Canadian federal Parliament an even broader power than 
that contained in the U.S. commerce clause, for it confers on the Ca-
nadian Parliament "exclusive Legislative Authority" over "The Regula-
tion of Trade and Commerce." The restriction to inter-state and over-
seas commerce found in the U.S. provision is not present, and the 
Canadian provision mentions trade as well as commerce. Neverthe-
less, the Canadian Supreme Court has conceded to the Canadian fed-
eral Parliament much narrower powers than has the U.S. Supreme 
Court to Congress. 
To some extent, this difference must be understood as merely a 
consequence of the different scheme of distribution of powers which 
9 Most notably, Professor Bruce Ackerman famously has asserted that the events of 
1937 amended the Constitution. For a discussion of this thesis and further references, see 
Elizabeth C. Price, Constitutional Fidelity and the Commrrce Clause: A Replv to Professor AckelC 
man, 48 SYRACUSE L. RE\,. 139 (1998). For a re-assertion of antijudicial review reasoning, 
see Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Politiml Safeguards of Federalism, 100 Co-
LUM. L. REv. 215 (2000); and cf Benjamin W. Roberson, Abortion as Cormnrrce: The Impact of 
u.s. v. Lopez on the FTeedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, 50 \lAND. L. REv. 239, 247-
49 (1997); Candice Hoke, Arendt, Tushnet and Lopez: The Philosophiml Challenge Behind Ack-
rrman's Theory of Constitutional Mommts, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 903 (1994); Robert F. Na-
gel, Fedrralism as a Fundamental Value: National Lr'ague of Cities in Perspective, SUP. CT. RE\,. 81 
(1981); Mark Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional Moment?: Lopez and Constitutional Theory 46 
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 845 (1996) (and the papers following his reprinted in the same jour-
nal) ;John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 13ll (1997). 
10 See, e.g., the two symposia on Lopez at 94 MICH. L. REv. 533-831 (1995); 46 CASE W. 
REs. L. REV. 633-959 (1996). Equivalent symposia on Morrison are doubtless in IKepara-
tion. 
11 Martha A. Field, The Diffmng Federalisms of Canada and the Unitl'd States, 55 LAw & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 107-12 (1992). A longer, but now somewhat dated, study was made 
by ALEXANDER SMITH, THE COMMERCE POWER IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 
(1963). 
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operates in Canada. The U.S. Constitution confers enumerated pow-
ers on the central government and leaves the residue with the states. 
The Canadian Constitution, in section 92, confers exclusive enumer-
ated powers on the provinces and leaves the residue with the center. 
However, "for greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality 
of the" conferral of the residue, section 91 sets out a list of powers 
conferred exclusively on the center. As already mentioned, one of 
these is "The Regulation of Trade and Commerce." This scheme for 
the distribution of powers, which was drafted in the 1860s, was meant 
to establish strong central control in order to avoid the weaknesses 
thought to have caused the American Civil War. In practice, however, 
the Canadian scheme has resulted in much stronger provincial 
autonomy than exists in the United States. The Courts undoubtedly 
have been motivated by a concern to allow the provinces some degree 
of independent legislative authority having regard to the differences 
among them, especially the difference between English Canada and 
Quebec,12 
One consequence of this scheme is that recognizing a power as 
belonging to the center under section 91 (2) withdraws it, at least if 
the logic of the system is followed,13 from the competence of the prov-
inces, as the power under section 91 (2) is exclusive,14 Therefore, a 
jurisprudence as generous to the federal government as the American 
jurisprudence would result in the virtually complete removal of all 
authority from the provinces. This consequence is avoided by a gen-
erous interpretation of sections 92(13) and (16), which confer exclu-
sive power on the provinces in relation to "Property and Civil Rights 
in the Province"15 and "Generally all Matters of a merely local or pri-
vate Nature in the Province" respectively,16 It is necessary, under the 
Canadian "pith and substance" approach to determining the nature 
12 This consideration was expressly referred to by the Privy Council in Attorney-
General (Canada) v. Attorney-General (Ontario) [1937] A.C. 326, 351. 
13 The "double aspect theory" sometimes disturbs this tidy scheme. See, e.g., Bell Can-
ada v. Quebec [1988]1 S.C.R. 749, 765. 
14 For a commentary from an Australian perspective, see Huddart Parker Ltd. et al. v. 
Commonwealth (1931) 44 C.L.R. 492, 526. 
15 For the origin of this phrase, see PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw OF CANADa 
36,545-46 (4th ed., 1997). 
16 On the choice between the two sub-sections, see HOGG, supra note 15, at 530 n.9. 
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of statutes,17 to decide which heading a particular statute in truth falls 
under. 
B. The Parsons Tests 
As early as 1881, the Privy Council (which, sitting in London, was 
the final Court of appeal for Canadian constitutional issues until 
1949) 18 held in Citizens Insurance oj Canada v. Parsons19 that section 
91 (2) was, despite the absence of an express limitation to this effect, 
limited to "regulation of trade in matters of inter-provincial concern" 
as well as international trade. Secondly, it was held that section 91 (2) 
"may ... include general regulation of trade affecting the whole"20 of 
Canada. These are the two branches of trade and commerce which 
the federal Parliament may regulate in Canada. All other forms of 
trade and commerce come within provincial authority. 
Although a trend slightly more generous to the federal govern-
ment can be detected in more recent cases, which allow control of 
intra-provincial transactions when the purpose of the legislation can 
be said to be extra-provincial,21 the distinctions made in Parsons, in 
essence, still constitute good law.22 It is necessary to determine 
whether a statute's "pith and substance" is a matter of federal or pro-
vincial concern. Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada held in the late 
1970s that the transformation of primary agricultural products into 
food, even for extra-provincial trade, was a matter for regulation by 
the provinces, as such activity did not come within either of the two 
Parsons branches.23 However, it may be otherwise if production quotas 
17 See, e.g., Russell v. R (1882) 7 App. Cas. 829, 839; Union Colliery of British Colum-
bia v. Bryden [1899] A.C. 580, 587; Shannon v. Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board 
[1938] A.C. 708, 720. 
18 For an interesting recent discussion of the Privy Council's influence on Canadian 
constitutional law, see David Schneiderman, Harold Laski, Viscount Haldane and the Lalli of the 
Canadian Constitution in the Early Twentieth Century. 48 U. TORONTO LJ. 521, 525, 555-59 
(1998). For further references, see HOGG, supra note 15, at 119. 
19 (1881) 7 App. Cas. 96,113. 
20 [d. 
21 Particularly R v. Klassen (1960) 20 D.L.R.2d 406 (the Supreme Court of Canada re-
fused leave to appeal in this case: [1959] S.C.R. ix); Caloil v. Attorney-General (Canada) 
[1971 J S.C.R. 543; see alm Labat! Breweries v. Attorney-General (Canada) [1980 J 1 S.C.R. 
914,942; General Motors of Canada v. City National Leasing [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641, 659. See 
Neil Finkelstein, Recent Case, 68 CAN. BAR. REv. 802, 805 (1989); HOGG, supra note 15, at 
533; P.W. Hogg, Comments, 54 CAN. BAR. REv. 361, 367 (1976); Paul C. Weiler, The Supreme 
Court and the Lalli of Canadian Federalism, 23 U. TORONTO LJ. 307, 331 (1973). 
22 As is shown by Dominion Stores v. R [19801 1 S.C.R. 844; MacDonald v. Vapor Can-
ada [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134, 160, 164; General Motors of Canada. 1 S.C.R. at 656, 659. 
23 Re Agricultural Products Marketing Act [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198, 1293. 
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are, in "pith and substance," an attempt to control inter-provincial or 
international prices, for those are matters for the federal government 
under the first limb of the Parsons test,2L-a conclusion that would 
have delighted President Roosevelt. 
C. The Canadian New Deal 
One result of the Canadian jurisprudence is that the Canadian 
New Deal fared rather worse in the courts than did the American New 
Deal after 1937. Thus, the Privy Council struck down-in a series of 
three decisions handed down on January 28, 1937, just as President 
Roosevelt was preparing to reveal his "Court-packing" plan-attempts 
by the federal Parliament to regulate conditions of labor,25 to provide 
unemployment insurance,26 and to control the marketing of natural 
products generally.27 However, the reaction was muted, and there was 
no "Court-packing" plan. This result is partly due to the fact that the 
composition of the Privy Council was beyond the influence of the Ca-
nadian government. Furthermore, the government of R.B. Bennett, 
which had promoted the legislation concerned, had, by January 1937, 
been replaced by Mackenzie King's Liberal government.28 Nor was 
there any immediate attempt to end appeals in constitutional issues to 
the Privy Council, as had happened for criminal cases in the 1930s.29 
Rather, the Canadian authorities played the game by its rules and se-
cured an amendment to what was then the British North America Act 
1867 (Imp.)30 to grant to the federal government the power to pro-
vide unemployment insurance31 which the Privy Council had refused 
to recognize in 1937. 
24 Cenu'al Canada Potash v. Saskatchewan [1979] 1 S.C.R. 42. Now, section 92A(2) of 
the Constitution, added in 1982, might permit provincial legislation in the circumstances 
considered in this case, see HOGG, supra note 15, at 566, but that has nothing to do with the 
meaning of the trade and COlIlmerce power. 
25 See Attorney-General (Canada) v. Attorney-General (Ontario) [1937] A.C. 326. 
26 See Attorney-General (Canada) v. Attorney-General (Ontario) [1937] A.C. 355. 
27 See Attorney-General (B.-itish Columbia) v. Attorney-General (Canada) [1937] A.C. 
377. 
28 On this episode in Canadian history, see EDGAR McINNIS, CANADA: A POLITICAL AND 
SOCIAL HISTORY 458-62 (1959); ERNEST WATKINS, R.B. BENNETT: A BIOGRAPHY 214-17 
(1963). 
29 See Nadan v. R [1926] A.C. 482; British Coal v. R [1935] A.C. 500; Attorney-General 
(Ontario) v. Attorney-General (Canada) [1947] A.C. 127. 
30 Since the patriation of the Canadian Constitution under Pierre Trudeau in 1982, 
the Canadian Constitution ofl867 has been called the Constitution Act 1867 (Can.). 
31 See section 91 (2A) of the Constitution Act 1867 (added in 1940). 
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The Privy Council, however, did not strike down all Canadian 
New Deal legislation. It held another three statutes valid on January 
28, 1937. From a legal point of view, the three favorable decisions did 
not do much to extend federal power over trade and commerce. Even 
general moratorium legislation32 and statutes criminalizing restrictive 
trade practices33 were held valid only under the federal power over 
bankruptcy and insolvency (section 91 (21» and criminal laws (sec-
tion 91 (27» respectively, not under the trade and commerce power. 
In relation to the moratorium legislation, it is worth recalling that, in 
Canada, there is no concept of "substantive due process." Only legisla-
tion relating to trademarks and a "national trade mark" (the "Canada 
Standard") was held to come within section 91 (2) .34 
D. The Current Tests 
As a result, perhaps, both of a lack of occasion and of an oppor-
tunity to "pack" a court, Canadian law knows no dramatic caesura in 
the interpretation of the trade and commerce power such as occurred 
in the United States in 1937, and the Parsons approach has never been 
overruled. A selection of cases from the 1980s and 1990s confirms the 
limited nature of that power as vested in the Canadian federal legisla-
ture by holdings that would be inconceivable in the United States, 
even after Morrison. In Canada, there continues to be a distinction 
between inter-provincial trade and commerce and other sorts of trade 
and commerce, as well as between trade and commerce and things 
that are not trade and commerce. 
Thus, a storage facility receiving liquefied natural gas in one 
province from another province is not within the federal Parliament's 
trade and commerce power even though the gas is sold to customers: 
by the time the gas has reached the storage facility, it is no longer part 
of inter-provincial trade but is part of a local network only.35 Nor is the 
operator of amusement rides who offers his services in Canada and 
the United States within the trade and commerce power.36 The pro-
32 See Attorney-General (British Columbia) v. Attorney-General (Canada) [1937] A.C. 
391. 
33 See Attorney-General (Canada) v. Attorney-General (British Columbia) [1937] A.C. 
368. 
34 See Attorney-General (Ontario) v. Attorney-General (Canada) [1937] A.C. 405, 417. 
Even this conclusion now seems to be in doubt as a \'esult of later decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Canada. HOGG, supra note 15, at 539. 
35 Re Ontario Energy Bd. (1986) 32 D.L.R.4th 706. 
36 See Conklin & Garrett v. Ontario (1989) 63 D.L.R.4th 545, 549. 
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duction of pornographic videos for inter-provincial trade is not a mat-
ter for the Canadian government, but for the provinces.37 The first 
limb of the Parsons test38 will not be satisfied, in other words, if a stat-
ute deals not with matters of inter-provincial or international con-
cern, but merely with isolated, local manifestations of trade that hap-
pen to occur in different provinces or countries. And, in principle, 
trade and commerce does not include production. 
The second limb of the Parsons test-general regulation of trade 
affecting the whole of Canada-is even now, 120 years after Parsons, 
not fully explored territory,39 mostly due to the failure of the federal 
Parliament to exploit the possibilities inherent in it.40 However, the 
outlines of Canadian jurisprudence on this score have emerged rela-
tively recently in cases such as MacDonald v. Vapor Canada Ltd.41 and 
General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City Nationwide Leasing.42 Attempts to 
codifY private law, such as tort law, will be looked upon unfavorably by 
the Court: in MacDonald, a federal statute prohibiting any act or busi-
ness practice "contrary to honest industrial or commercial usage in 
Canada" was seen as an attempt to create a general federal action in 
tort law, which is a matter that comes under the jurisdiction of the 
provinces.43 The statute was therefore invalid. On the other hand, 
general regulatory schemes dealing not with provincial matters re-
ferred to in sections 92(13) and (16), but with well-defined public 
goods relevant to trade generally, such as fair competition, will be up-
held, as in General Motors. 
This even-handed and principled approach shows that fears-or 
hopes4-L-that, once the federal Parliament began to exploit the sec-
ond limb of Parsons, no logical limit could be found to its powers have 
not been realized. The Court has expressly held that the mere fact 
that an industry may extend across the whole country does not make 
it a matter affecting the whole country;45 as long as this jurisprudence 
is maintained, there is no prospect of a disappearance of the distinc-
tion between inter- and intra-provincial trade and commerce, let 
37 See It's Adult Video Plus v. British Columbia (1991) 81 D.L.R.4th 436, 445-54. 
38 See supra, lIB. 
39 General Molars of Canada, 1 S.C.R. at 657. 
40 See Weiler, supra note 21, at 362. 
412 S.C.R. 134. 
42 1 S.C.R. 641. 
43 See MacDonald, 2 S.C.R. at 141-42, 149. 
44 See Weiler, supra note 21, at 332. 
45 Labatt Breweries, 1 S.c.R. 914 (product standards regulation for beer invalid). 
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alone the distinction between trade and commerce and everything 
else. 
The Supreme Court of Canada, in its unanimous judgment in 
General Motors, recognized that its job is to balance, as best it can, the 
competing claims of federal and provincial legislatures, and devel-
oped quite an involved method of doing SO.46 The judgment is very 
closely reasoned, a first-class example of the judicial craft, and repays 
study by those who would abandon judicial review of commerce 
clauses because it is allegedly too difficult to draw boundaries in this 
area. The case concerned a federal anti-trust statute and the associ-
ated right to damages for breach. The right to damages was attacked, 
and it was vulnerable to attack because rights to damages are gener-
ally part of tort law, and thus, as in Vapor Canada, generally fall under 
provincial control. 
In General Motors, the Court assessed, first, the extent to which the 
damages section intruded on provincial powers, second, the validity of 
the statute as a whole, and third, the extent to which the damages sec-
tion was connected to the rest of the statute, to the extent that the 
statute was valid.47 In the first step, the Court held that the damages 
section did indeed encroach on provincial powers, but noted that it 
was a remedial provision and an adjunct to the rest of the statute 
rather than a free-standing right to damages. The encroachment, 
therefore, did not mean that the right to damages was invalid if the 
rest of the statute was valid and the damages section was sufficiently 
well integrated into its scheme.48 
The second step was to assess the validity of the statute. In so do-
ing, a list of five criteria, developed in MacDonald and further elabo-
rated in General Motors, was relevant. It must be stressed, however, that 
this is not a list of mandatory requirements that a statute must meet in 
order to be valid under the second limb of Parsons, but merely a help-
fullist of criteria that the Court will take into account. The list of cri-
teria is as follows: (1) the existence of a general regulatory scheme; 
(2) the oversight of a regulatory agency; (3) a concern with trade as a 
whole rather than with a particular trade; (4) the constitutional in-
ability of the provinces, jointly or severally, to enact the scheme con-
cerned; and (5) the need for national rather than provincial regula-
tion if a scheme is to be effective.49 
46 See 1 S.C.R. at 659, 666. 
47 See id. at 663-72. 
48 See id. at 672-74. 
49 See MacDonald, 2 S.C.R. at 158, 165; General Motors, 1 S.C.R. at 662. 
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Although some do not understand the need for the first two cri-
teria,50 the reason is apparent: public regulation indicates that the 
matter concerned is of general importance and shows that the federal 
statute does not merely deal with private grievances or tort laws, which 
are subjects reserved for the provinces. 51 The last three criteria are, of 
course, indications that the problem is one which goes beyond intra-
provincial trade. 
The regulatory scheme at issue in General Motors met all five crite-
ria, and the statute as a whole was therefore valid.52 The only remain-
ing question was whether the damages section was sufficiently related 
to the statute as a whole. The "correct approach," the Court indi-
cated, was "to ask whether the provision is functionally related to the 
general objective of the legislation, and to the structure and the con-
tent of the scheme," or whether it had been "tacked on. "53 The Court 
had little difficulty concluding that the award of damages for breach 
of a valid anti-trust statute was "functionally related" to that statute.54 
The intrusion into provincial jurisdiction identified in the first stage 
therefore could be justified by the fact that it was associated in a 
sufficiently close way with a scheme that, as a whole, was valid. The 
intrusion was different from that involved in the federal statute in-
validated in Vapor Canada in a number of respects, chiefly its close 
connection with a general regulatory scheme and its less broad and 
undefined nature.55 
Further guidance from the Supreme Court of Canada may be 
forthcoming. The Court of Appeal for Newfoundland held in Ward v. 
Canada that a federal prohibition on selling a type of seal is invalid. 56 
The Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal in this case on 
June 29, 2000.57 It is of interest that the Court of Appeal did not con-
sider whether the prohibition could be supported under sec-
tion 91 (2). Rather, it directed its "entire attention"58 to section 91 (12) 
("Sea Coast and Inland Fisheries") as the only possible source of valid-
ity under section 9l. In the United States, there would be few prob-
lems in upholding a statute of this nature under the commerce 
50 See HOGG, supra note 15, at 542. 
51 See id. 
52 See 1 S.C.R. at 677-83. 
53 Id. at 683. 
54 See id. at 683-93. 
55 Id. at 690-92. 
56 (1999)182 D.L.RAth 172,218. 
57 Bulletin of Proceedings, Supreme Court of Canada, July 21, 2000. 
58 182 D.L.R.4th at 176. 
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clause. It will be interesting to see whether the Supreme Court of 
Canada says anything about the trade and commerce power when it 
considers the appeal. 
E. Summary 
In summary, then, Canada not only refuses to follow pre-Lopez 
American jurisprudence in considering virtually everything as trade 
and commerce; it also continues to make a distinction between inter-
and intra-provincial trade and commerce, only the former coming 
within federal power. This is so even though such a distinction is not 
expressly made in its Constitution, unlike in the U.S. commerce 
clause. While no one could claim that the Canadian Court has an-
swered in advance all questions that might arise concerning the reach 
of the trade and commerce clause, Canadian experience disproves 
the assertion by the dissenting Justices in Lopez and Morrison that it is 
not possible to make a distinction between commerce and things 
merely affecting commerce incidentally, or between intra-state and 
inter-state commerce. 
III. AUSTRALIA59 
A. Distribution of Powers 
The Australian Constitution, in its general approach to the divi-
sion of powers, is much more like the American than the Canadian 
Constitution. Enumerated powers are conferred on the federal legis-
lature, and the residue is left with the states. Australia is also like the 
United States, and unlike Canada, in another respect: although there 
are differences among the Australian states, they are not nearly as 
large as the legal and cultural differences between Quebec and the 
rest of Canada, which are responsible, to a great extent, for the rela-
tively strong position of the provinces in Canada. 
Section 51 (i) of the Australian federal Constitution confers 
power on the federal legislature to legislate "with respect to ... Trade 
59 P.E. Nygh, An Analysis of Judicial Approaches to the Intelpl1!tation of the Commerce Clause in 
Australia and the United States, 5 SVD. L. REv. 353 (1967);Jeremy Philips & Eytan Uliel, U.S. 
v. Lopez: Constitutional Inwpretation in the United States and Australia, 18 U. N.S. WALES. LJ., 
532 (1995); LESLIE ZINES, THE HIGH COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION Ch. 4 (4th ed., 
1997). 
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and commerce with other countries, and among the States. "60 In this 
context, it is of interest that the High Court of Australia61 has refused, 
in the interpretation of section 51 (i) of the Australian Constitution, to 
follow not only the post-New-Deal American jurisprudence, but some 
aspects of the pre-New-Deal jurisprudence as well. This is despite the 
fact that, on their face, the words used in the Australian Constitution 
are broader than those in the U.S. Constitution: the Australian power, 
as in Canada, includes trade as well as commerce, but, unlike the 
equivalent power in Canada, is not restricted to a power of "regula-
tion."62 
B. Explicit Rejection of u.s. Law 
The High Court of Australia has "always"63 refused to accept the 
"commingling" doctrine accepted by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in cases such as the Shreveport Rates Case,64 holding that 
the distinction which is drawn between inter-State trade and 
the domestic trade of a State . . . may well be considered 
artificial and unsuited to modern times. But it is a distinction 
adopted by the Constitution and it must be observed how-
ever much inter-dependence may now exist between the two 
60 By section 98 of the Constitution, this power includes power over navigation, ship-
ping, and state railways. This section is not an independent head of power; its effect is 
merely to confirm that navigation, etc., if inter-state or international, come within sec-
tion 51 (i): see Owners of the "S.S. KaIibia" v. Wilson (1910) 11 C.L.R. 689, 697, 707, 713; 
Newcastle & Hunter River Steamship v. Attorney-General (Commonwealth) (1921) 29 
C.L.R. 357, 368. The Canadian equivalent of section 98 is section 91 (10); cf also sec-
tion 92(10) in conjunction with section 91 (29). 
61 This court is the highest court in Australia. In combining general appellate func-
tions with the functions of a constitutional tribunal, the High Court of Australia has func-
tions very much like that of the Supreme Court of Canada (except that the Australian 
Court has no advisOl'y jurisdiction). 
62 This difference was pointed out early on in Australia: cf Attorney-General (New S. 
Wales) v. Brewery Employees' Union of New S. Wales (1908) 6 C.L.R. 469, 614. Intrigu-
ingly, the Australian Constitution, until tlle final dJ'afting changes, did provide only for 
power with respect to "the regulation of trade and commerce with other countries and 
among the several States" (emphasis added). This was amended to the present form with-
ont discussion in the Convention: J. A. LA NAUZE, THE MAKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN CON-
STITUTION 236 n. * (1974). La Nauze asks whether the original version of the federal power 
could have been interpreted as more J'estrictive. 
63 R v. Burgess; ex parte HenlY (1936) 55 CL.R. 608, 628; see also id. at 677. For a com-
prehensive list of the statements in the High Court of Australia on this topic, see Nygh, 
supra note 59, at 394. 
64 Houston, E. & W. Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914). 
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divisions of trade and commerce which the Constitution thus 
distinguishes.65 
247 
Still less will the Court permit all imaginable activities to be sub-
sumed under the heading of "commerce," as appeared to be the di-
rection of U.S. case law before Lopez. There is no trace in Australia of 
a doctrine that any activity that affects commerce may be regulated 
under the trade and commerce power. 
Therefore, while the power granted by section 51 (i) can be used 
to prohibit export entirely, or subject to conditions determined by the 
federal Parliament (whether otherwise relevant to trade and com-
merce or not),66 a definition of "trade and commerce" is adopted 
which, while not identical to American jurisprudence of the late nine-
teenth century, would have been entirely recognizable to the Justices 
of the Supreme Court of the United States who were sitting when the 
Australian Constitution was being drafted in the 1890s.67 
In Australian constitutional law, for example, production is not 
itself trade or commerce.68 In relation to overseas commerce, it has 
admittedly been suggested that the federal Parliament's powers under 
section 51 (i) may, in certain circumstances, be extended by use of the 
incidental power-the equivalent of the "necessary and proper" 
clause-to cover production in the "factory or the field or the 
mine. "69 However, this suggestion has not been extended to inter-state 
as distinct from overseas trade in order that the constitutional distinc-
tion between inter-state and intra-state trade may be maintained.70 
Moreover, this suggestion is an expression not of the core mean-
ing of the trade and commerce power, but of the incidental power 
65 SeeWraggv. New South Wales (1953) 88 C.L.R. 353, 385. For similar statements, see 
R v. Burgess; ex parte Henry, 55 C.L.R. at 672; Airlines of New S. Wales v. New S. Wales (No. 
2) (1965) ll3 C.L.R. 54, ll5. 
66 O'Sullivan v. Noarlunga Meat Ltd. (1954) 92 C.L.R. 565, 594; see also Murphyores v. 
Commonwealth (1976) 136 C.L.R. 1 (l-egulations conditionally prohibiting export valid 
although environmental factors were the motive behind the legislation). Cf United States 
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
67 Nygh, supra note 59, at 360-63. 
68 See Grannall v. Marrickville Margarine Ltd. (1955) 93 C.L.R. 55, 77; see also Beal v. 
Marrickville Margarine Ltd. (1966) ll4 C.L.R. 283. For further discussion on the 
definition of "trade and commerce" and of "inter-State trade and commerce," see ZINES, 
supra note 59, at 548. The equivalent U.S. doctrine from the late 1890s is, of course, to be 
found in United Statesv. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895). 
69 0 'Sullivan, 92 C.L.R. at 598. 
70 This difference is referred to expressly by Justice Stephen in Attorney-General 
(Western Australia) (ex reI. Ansett Transport Industries (Operations» v. Australian Nat'l 
Airlines Comm'n (1976) 138 C.L.R. 492, 509; see also ZINES, supra note 59, at 66. 
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attached to it. Thus, there must be a significant relationship between 
production and trade and commerce if production is to be regulated 
under section 51 (i). It has been held that a merely economic connec-
tion with trade and commerce will not suffice. Therefore, the federal 
legislature cannot confer power on an airline owned by the federal 
government to fly within one state merely in order to make the air-
line's inter-state operations more profitable;71 only if the safety of in-
ter-state air travel is involved can the federal legislature regulate intra-
state air traveI.72 As in the U.S. before Wickard, the connection must 
be direct, not indirect. Accordingly, the employment of workers gen-
erally, as distinct from workers actually engaged in inter-state or over-
seas trade or commerce, also does not come under section 51 (i).73 
The contrast between the Australian and the pre-Lopez U.S. posi-
tions could not be more striking: the Australian courts refuse to con-
sider all commerce as inter-state and refuse to use economic criteria 
to determine whether a particular activity has the required connec-
tion with inter-state commerce. Australian Courts, like the Canadian 
courts, would not dream of calling everything commerce just because 
everything affects commerce. 
C. Other Powers 
It must be admitted that, despite the similarity in the broad 
scheme for the distribution of powers between the United States and 
Australia, there is one major difference relevant to the area under 
consideration here: the Australian Constitution, unlike the American, 
confers on the federal legislature power over "foreign corporations, 
and trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of' 
Australia (section 51(xx». Much of what must be subsumed under 
the American commerce clause can be dealt with in Australia under 
section 51 (xx) (a fact which also explains the relatively small number 
of cases under the Australian trade and commerce power compared 
to the American commerce clause or, for that matter, the Canadian 
trade and commerce power). However, the Australian corporations' 
power is not interpreted with anything near the generosity of the pre-
Lopez American jurisprudence. Thus, in Re Dingjan; ex parte Wagner,74 a 
71 Australian Nat 'I Airlines Comm 'n, 138 C.L.R. 492. 
72 R v. Burgess; ex parte Henry, 55 C.L.R. at 627; Airlines of New S. Wales Ltd., 113 C.L.R. 
at 54. 
73 See Huddart Parker, 44 C.L.R. at 492. 
74 (1995) 183 C.L.R. 323, 323. See also Victoria v. Commonwealth (Industrial Relations 
Act Case) (1996) 187 C.L.R. 416, 553-558. 
2001] Commerce C/,ause 249 
statute permitting the setting aside of contracts "relating to the busi-
ness of' a corporation referred to in section 51 (xx) was held invalid. 
Section 51 (xx), in other words, is nothing like a power over anything 
that might affect the business of a corporation. 
Space does not permit here any further examination of the evolv-
ing Australian case law on section 51 (xx), nor of the view expressed in 
some quarters that the interpretation of a federal power totally unre-
lated to trade and commerce-that over external affairs (section 
51 (xxix) )-might, with the growth in the number and coverage of 
international agreements, eventually have the potential to confer un-
restricted, or insufficiently restricted, authority on the federal Parlia-
ment.75 It is sufficient to note that the dissenters in Lopez. and Morrison 
can claim no support for their view from constitutional interpretation 
in Australia. 
CONCLUSION 
Admittedly, one of the assertions of the minorities in Lopez. and 
Morrison76 is confirmed by a consideration of the Canadian and Aus-
tralian law: in neither of those two countries is the law completely cer-
tain. But in what area is the law completely certain? Canadian and 
Australian courts show a distinct preference for drawing lines beyond 
which their respective federal legislatures may not go, even though 
this leads to some uncertainty, in borderline cases, about whether or 
not a particular statute is invalid. 
The experience of both countries, and especially of Canada, 
shows that it is possible to develop over time a reasonably well-
rounded and predictable series of criteria to assist in the judgments 
that must be made in connection with judicial review on federal 
grounds. Drawing such lines will not always be easy; it will not involve 
criteria that can be automatically applied without further thought. 
But judges are not paid to carry out tasks that are easy and require no 
thought. With a degree of effort that is well within their capacity, 
judges can enforce a distinction between things that are, and things 
75 See, e.g., Industrial Relations Act Case, 187 C.L.R. at 568, citing Lopez., 131 L.Ed.2d 626, 
648-49; Daryl Dawson, The Constitution-Major Overhaul 01' Simple Tune-up?, 14 MELBOURNE 
U. L. REv. 353, 359 (1984). 
76 Lopez., 514 U.S. at 630; Morrison, 120 S.Ct. at 1759-60. Thomas,]. aptly commented 
that "the one advantage of the dissent's standanl is certainty: it is certain that under its 
analysis everything may be regulated under the guise of the commerce clause." Lopez., 514 
U.S. at 600. 
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that are not, inter-state and overseas commerce, and they can do so in 
a way that is tolerably certain and predictable. 
It is, of course, a grave error to attempt to draw conclusions from 
comparative law without taking into account the differences that exist 
between countries. The differences between Canada and the United 
States, in particular, are quite significant having regard to the differ-
ent schemes for the federal distribution of powers and, more broadly, 
the existence of a separate civil-law system in Quebec and the cultural 
differences between English Canada and Quebec. Nevertheless, the 
Canadian experience is valuable not because the United States should 
draw the line in the same place as the Canadians-given the differ-
ences, such an argument could not possibly be sustained-but be-
cause it shows that the enterprise of line-drawing is not a hopeless or 
pointless one. The Australian jurisprudence, on the other hand, 
shows that, in a system which divides powers between the center and 
the regions in much the same way as the United States (enumerated 
federal powers, residue to the states), lines can be drawn between in-
ter-state commerce and everything else. It is not just the peculiar set-
up of the Canadian scheme for the distribution of powers that enables 
such a thing to happen. 
More broadly, there is, in both Canada and Australia, not a trace 
of the skepticism about judicial review which motivates and lies be-
hind much of the debate in and around Lopez and Morrison. Neither 
the Canadian nor the Australian Constitution contains any more 
compelling indication than exists in the United States Constitution 
that the Courts are authorized to practice judicial review on federal-
ism grounds. Nevertheless, judicial review is considered, in both coun-
tries, as "axiomatic"77 in a federal system, in part because of the ex-
ample of the United States. Despite all the doubts in the United States 
about the legitimacy of judicial review, it was clearly being practiced 
there when both the Canadian and Australian Constitutions were writ-
ten. The drafters of each of those documents, therefore, considered 
that it was a natural part of federalism which would also exist in the 
systems which they were setting up. Furthermore, judicial review of 
colonial legislation had existed even before the federations them-
selves. 
Even so, the lack of a judicial antijudicial-review lobby in both 
Canada and Australia is quite striking. The legitimacy of judicial re-
view is simply a non-issue. In contrast to the United States, no judge in 
77 See Australian Communist Partyv. Commonwealth (1951) 83 C.L.R. 1,262. 
2001] Commerce Clause 251 
Canada or Australia advocates "that politics, not judicial review, 
should mediate between state and national interests as the strength 
and legislative jurisdiction of the National Government inevitably in-
creased through the expected growth of the national economy. "78 If 
asked about the legitimacy of judicial review, the overwhelming ma-
jority of Canadian79 or Australian80 constitutionalists would doubtless 
say that a scheme committing the enforcement of federalism to politi-
cians would be bound to be ineffective owing to "the absence of struc-
tural mechanisms to require [legislatures] to undertake this princi-
pled task, and the momentary political convenience often attendant 
upon their failure to do so. "81 
Comparative constitutional law cannot promise to the Justices of 
the Supreme Court of the United States any absolutely certain means 
of determining whether a statute is valid under the commerce clause. 
But it can say that, by enforcing the commerce clause and saying that 
at least some things do not come within it, the Supreme Court is on 
the right road, or at least on the same road as Canada and Australia. It 
also can say that the drawing of boundaries is a difficult task, but by 
no means impossible. By making these points, it lends support to the 
view that the over-reaction of the Supreme Court of the United States 
to its own errors in the 1930s and to the pressure that was placed on it 
as a result should be corrected, and that the United States should 
move back into the mainstream of modern federalism by re-
introducing effective judicial review of Congress's compliance with 
the commerce clause. 
78 Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1769 (Souter,]., dissenting). 
79 See the discussion in HOGG, supra note 15, at 124-32. 
80 BRIAN GALLIGAN, POLITICS OF THE HIGH COURT: A STUDY OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 
OF GOVERNMENT IN AUSTRALIA 43 (1989). 
81 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 578; see also Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enu-
merated Powers"; In Defense of U.s. v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 752, 790-99 (1995); Merritt, 
sU/Jra note 6, at 691-92; Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower COllrt Readings of 
Lopez, or, What if the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, WIS. L. 
REv. 369, 371 (2000). The merits of a certain degree of judicial restraint are, however, 
recognized, especially in Canada owing to its involved scheme for the distribution of pow-
ers. General Motors, 1 S.C.R. at 669. 
